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In previous work, William Lycan (1984) and I (in Geis 
(1973, 1985, 1986a, 1986b), have developed a syntactically 
and semantically motivated theory of conditional sentences in 
which it is claimed that pairs like (la) and (lb) have 
essentially the same logical forms. 
(1) 	 a. I will leave if you leave. 
b. 	 I will leave in any circumstance in which 
you leave. 
On the semantic side, we have argued that ll-clauses involve 
restricted universal quantification over situations or 
circumstances (cf. Geis (1973) and Lycan (1984)). On the 
syntactic side, we have argued that ll-clauses are a species 
of free relative clause and are syntactically quite like the 
adverbial relative Hll§n-clause of ( 2), · 
(2) 	 I will leave when you leave. 
Documentation of the syntactic similarities between sentences 
like (la) and (2) is provided in Geis (1985). 
In Geis (1986a, 1986b), I suggested that conditional and 
certain other types of adverbials a·re instances of what I 
called "situation adverbs." Their function is to identify 
the situations or circumstances in which actions .or states of 
affairs obtain. Thus, in (la), the ll-.clause identifies a 
situation in which the speaker's leaving ·will obtain, this 
situation being that the hearer. leave. In this paper, I 
would like· to discuss some of the special features of 
situation adverbs and to discuss how situation and temporal 
adverbials interact. 
Situation Adverbials 
The paradigm cases of situation· adverbials are 
conditionaL adverbials such · as those in ( 3) , which are 
hypothetical situation adverbials, and concessive adverbials 
such as those in (4), which are factive situation adverbials. 
(3) 	 a. I will leave if you leave. 
b. I will leave only if you leave. 
c. I will leave even if you leave. 







will leave although I don't want to. 
will leave despite the fact that·r don't 
want to. 
c. I will leave even though I don't want to. 
I say that· concessives are £active because sentences 
containing · complex concessive adverbials entail the 
propositions expressed· by the subordinate concessive clause. 
Thus, all of (4) entail 
(5) 	 I don't want. to leave. 
The semantic similarity between i3c) and (4c) is especially 
close. One's intuition is that they are minimal pairs 
differing only with respect to the semantic property of 
£activity (or its opposite, hyp~theticalness). 
Multiple Situation Adverbials 
One of the most interesting properties of conditional 
clauses is that more.than one can occur in a given clause. 
Consider, for instance, such sentence-s as (6). 
(6) 	 a. If John's car won't start, I will drive 
you home if my car ,doesn't break down. 
b. 	 If John's car doesn't start, I' will drive 
you home unless it snows. 
Moreover, both conditional and concessive clauses can occur 
as members of a given clause. Consider (7). 
(7) 	 a. Although I don't· want to take you to work, 
I will do so if my car doesn't break 
down. 
b. 	 If your car doesn't break. down, mine 
probably will even though it is brand 
new. 
And, .multiple concessive clauses also occur together, as is 
shown by ( 8 ) . 
(8) 	 a. Although I didn't want to leave, John 
asked me to even though he knew that he 
shouldn't. 
b. 	 Despite the fact that I was told not to, I 
applied for the job even though I didn't 
think I had ,a chance to get it. 
Multiple occurrences of a given type of adverbial in a 
single clause are,. in general, impossible unless they form 
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what I shall call a- "semantically nested construction." Note 
that in a hovel refers to a location in Boston in (9). 
(9) John lives in a hovel in Boston. 
One can form paraphrases of in a hovel in Boston in which the 
nesting is made quite explicit: in a hovel which is in 
~- And, in general, if more than one .locative adverbial 
occurs in a given clause, the result will be a nested 
locative construction. 
Sentences containing multiple temporal phrases and 
clauses are tricky because temporal adverbials can be 
interpreted as situation adverbials in certain linguistic 
contexts. Let us begin by noting that two instantaneous time 
adverbials cannot occur together in a clause: 
(10) *John left at noon at five. 
If two time adverbials occur in a given clause, one will 
normally refer to a time or interval within the interval 
referred to by the other, as in (11). 
(11) John left at noon on Friday. 
The sequence at noon on Friday is clearly a semantically 
nested temporal construction. Semantic nesting occurs even 
when the time adverbials are not contiguous. This is true of 
the temporal adverbials of (12). 
(12) a. On Friday, I will leave at noon. 
b. I will next week leave at noon. 
There are apparent counter-examples to the claim that 
multiple occurrences of temporal adverbials in a single 
clause are nested. Consider (13). 
(13) When will you leave at ~oon? 
There are two logically possible ways in which one can take 
(13). One possibility is that .when refers to an interval 
within which the noontime in question occurred, i. e., 
when ••• at noon is a semantically nested construction. The 
other possible interpretation of (13) is that .when refers to 
some occasion or circumstance on which John left at noon. On 
this view, ( 13) has an interpretation something like ( 14) . 
(14) On what occasion will you leave at noon? 
Note that both of the questions (13) and (14) could be 
answered by either of the following sentences: 
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(15) 	 a. ·on Friday. 
b. When his father was in t.own. 
In (15a), on Friday is an explicit temporal adverbial, but 
the :'fil!1m-clause of (15b) could as likely refer to a situation 
as a time. In my view, the more plausible interpretation of 
(13) is the latter one, in which :'fil!1m is construed as a 
situation adverbial. The question arises as to why some 
temporal adverbials can be used as situation adverbials. 
As .these data make clear, some. temporal constructions, 
especially temporal pronouns like lW&n (cf. (13) and .t,rum and 
when-clauses (cf. (15b)), can function as situation 
adverbials, albeit nonstandard· ones. Such interpretations 
are forced when they occur with explicit temporal adverbials 
in circumstances in which semantic nesting is not possible. 
Note that each of the lW&n-clauses of (16c) is 
consistent with the main clause I will leave, but the result 
of combining them is very strange. 
(16) 	 a. When you leave, I will leave. 
b. I will leave when Mary wakes up. 
C. 	 *When you leave,· I will leave when Mary 
wakes ·up. 
One might squeeze out an interpretation of (16c) by 
construing when you leave as a situation adverbial, i. e., 
one that refers to some occasion or situation. Nevertheless, 
it should be clear that having two :'fil!1m-clauses in a given 
clause leads to a much less acceptable sentence than does 
having more than one genuine situation adverbial. As a 
result, we must view temporal clauses as highly marked 
situation adverbials. How, exactly, we are to account for 
this is something of a mystery. 
Though it must be conceded that the facts surrounding 
multiple occurrences of temporal constructions in a single 
clause are cloudy, one genei'alization holds true: whenever 
we have two explicit temporal constructions they comprise a 
semantically nested construction or one of them will be 
interpreted as~ situation adverbial. We may conclude, then, 
that we do not get two or more non-,nested, semantically
independent,. explicitly temporal adverbials in a given
clause. 
Multiple Occurrences of Situation and Temporal Clauses 
It is possible to mix temporal and concessive clauses in 
the same clause. However, when such a situation does occur, 
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the temporal clause is clearly in the scope of the 
situational clause. I believe that if neither of the 
included clauses of the following pairs of sentences. are read 
appositively, then the better sentence is one in which the 
conditional adverbial is outside the scope of the temporai 
adverbial: 
(17) 	 a. I leave for work when my wife does unless 
it snows. 
b. 	*I leave for work unless it snows when my 
wife does. 
(18) 	 a. I will leave for work before you do if it 
snows. 
b. 	*I will leave for work if it snows before 
you do. 
The same seems to be true of mixes of temporal and concessive 
clauses: 
(19) 	a. I will leave for work when you do although
I suspect it will rain. 
b. 	*I will leave for work although I suspect 
it will rain when you leave for work. 
Semantically, it is quite clear that the temporal clause 
is in.side the scope of the concessive clause in an elliptical 
sentence such as (28). · 
(20) 	 I will leave for work when you do although I 
told Bill I wouldn't. 
Sentences 	(20) clearly has the same meaning as (21). 
(21) 	 I will leave for work when You do although I 
told Bill I wouldn't leave for work when You 
.dQ. 
Clearly, the phrase leave for work when You do is in the 
scope of the concessive clause in these sentences. Note 
further that the ii-clause is outside the scope of the modal 
will in sentence (22). 
(22) 	 John will leave tomorrow if we ask him to do· 
so tonight. 
This provides further evidence that situation adverbs are 
outside .the scope of temporal constituents in main clauses. 
It would appear, then, that we are justified in thinking 
that temporal constructions are in the scope of situation 
adverbials.. The question arises as to how to account for 
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this. Suppose that we say that the function of time 
adverbials (and tense) is to date dateless state-
descriptions, i. e., a dateless description of a state of 
affairs or action. We might formalize a sentence like (23a) 
as in (23b). 
(23) 	 a. John died at noon. 
b. 	 (~t)(At(Die(John), t) & (t = noon) & 
EarlierThan (t, now)) 
It is important to recognize that the output of the temporal 
operator At is different from its input. The 
nonrecursiveness of temporal adverbials, including temporal 
clauses, we could say is the result of the fact that their 
input must be undated state-descriptions. 
Why are multiple conditi.onal clauses possible, when 
multiple temporal or locative clauses are not? Let us say 
that a situation is a state of affairs or action. Such 
sentences as (24) all describe situations. 
(24) 	 a. John kissed Mary. 
b. John will marrY. Mary. 
c. John plans to divorce Mary. 
Thus, (24a) refers to a situation in which John kissed Mary, 
(24b) to a future situation in which John marries Mary, and 
(24c) to a (more or less continuous) situation in which John 
plans to divorce Mary, Notice that the sentenc.es of ( 24) all 
entail the corresponding sentences of (25). 
(25) 	a. John kissed Mary in some situation. 
b. John will marry Mary in some situation. 
c. 	 John plans to divorce Mary in some 
situation. 
Thus, there is good reason to believe that ordinary dated 
state-descriptions refer to situations. It would appear ,from 
this than (24), no less than (25), refer.to situations. 
Following Lycan (1985), we might formalize (26a) as in 
(26b). 
(26) 	 a. I will leave in some situation. 
b. 	 ( '</ s)(In(( 3 t)(At(I leave, t) & 
EarlierThan(t, now))), s) 
In this sentence the function of the conditional adverbial 1n 
some situation is to situate a dated state-description, i. 
e., relativize it to a situation. In a sentence like (27) we 
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are being told that John's marrying Mary will obtain in a 
situation in which Mary asks him to marry her. 
(27) John will marry Mary if she asks him to. 
We might say, then, that this sentence will be true in any 
future circumstance in which Mary asks John to marry her and 
he does marry her. Let us notate this as in (28). 
(28) 	 (\/s)(In(Mary asks John to marry her, s) ---> 
In(John will marry Mary, s)) 
This sentence in turn refers to a class of situations in 
which John's marrying Mary is linked to her asking him to. 
Since this is itself a state-description, it can serve as the 
input to the operator il, as in (29). 
(29) 	 If his parents will permit, John will marry 
Mary if she asks him to. 
We may notate this as in (30). 
(30) 	 (~sl )(In(John's parents permit him to· marry 
Mary, s1) ----> In((Vs2)(In(John will marry 
Mary, s2) ---> In(John will marry Mary, s2), 
Sl ) ) 
Since s1 itself refers to a situation, we could in principle 
relativize it to some additional situation, say, the 
situation in which John has enough money to buy a house, as 
in (31). 
(31) 	 If John comes up with the money to buy a new 
house, he will marry Mary if she asks him to 
if his parents will permit him to do so. 
Though (31) is not the most naturai sentence, it strikes me 
as grammatical. Certainly it is quite clear in meaning. 
Abstractly, we can represent cases of multiple 
occurrences of conditional clauses as follows: 
(32) 	a. (1ts1 )(In(S, s1) ----> In (P, s1 ))
b. 	 ('o's2) (In(S, s2) ----> In( (\:Isl) ( In(Q, s1 )-
---> In (P, s1)), s2)) 
c. 	 (\/s3)(In(S, s3·) ----> ((1:,1s2)(In(R, s2)---
-> In((\ls1 )(In(Q, s1) ----> In (P, s1 ))), 
52 ) , 	 S3 ) ) 
Clearly, this process is recursive, allowing indefinitely 
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many conditional constructions to occur in a given clause. 
On this view, then, temporal constructions do not iterate 
because the output of the temporal operator at is different 
in type from its input. On the other hand, conditional 
constructions do iterate because the output of the operator
·in is the same in type as its input. 
We are now in a position to explain how it is that fill.fill,-
clauses can be construed as conditional clauses. Dated 
state-descriptions cannot serve as the input to the temporal 
(' 	 operator. A sentence like (33} is dated and cannot be re-
dated .. 
(33} John left at noon. 
Thus, if a temporal adverb like when is added to this 
sentence, as in (34), it must be construed as performing 
other than a dating function. 
(34) When did John leave at noon? 
In such a case, it functions as a situation adverb. When 
this is not possible for pragmatic or semantic reasons, as is 
true of (35), which suggests that John may have died more 
than once, the sentence is pragmatically unacceptable. 
(35) When did John die at noon? 
Why, though, is fill.fill, construed as a situation adverb in 
a sentence like (39), as opposed to something else? I would 
suggest that the reason is that times are crucial 
individuators of situations. Thus, John's leaving at noon is 
a different event from his leaving at midnight. I would 
suggest that the use of a time adverb to refer to a situation 
is metonymic in character, for as noted, the time at which a 
situation obtains is a crucial part of the make-up of a 
situation. 
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